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Some Untold Truths 
By Dean Rusk 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following was 
excerpted from an address by Dean Rusk, 
professor of international law at the Uni-
versity of Georgia Law School, and former 
U.S. secretary of state, 1961-1969. The 
occasion was the second annual Morde-
cai Wyatt Johnson Lecture at Howard 
University on January 26. The inaugural 
lecture last year in honor of the 13th 
president of the university was by Dr. 
Benjamin E. Mays, president emeritus of 
Morehouse College. 
It was Napoleon who was supposed to 
have said: "Let China sleep, for when she 
awakes the world will tremble." 
There are a few of you who can go back 
with me to my early boyhood days ... my 
youth, back in the early part of th is cen-
tury. It was a period when there was an 
affectionate, warm and friendly benevo-
lent attitude on the part of the American 
people towards the Chinese people, ex-
cept for a few on the West Coast who were 
worried about Chinese and Japanese im-
migration and competition for jobs. 
We studied China in the elementary 
school and incorporated China into our 
school plays and pageants and handicraft 
projects. At our churches, every year or 
two, our missionaries would come home 
and talk to us about China and show slides 
and tell us of their work there. As small 
boys, we would sit around in the backyard 
and talk about digging a ho le-knowing 
that if we dug deep enough, we'd see 
Chinese peering at us at the other end. 
We took some satisfaction out of the 
thought that the United States had some-
how opposed the attempts by wicked 
colonial powers to carve up China into 
spheres of influence. Harvard went to 
China, so did Yale. The Rockefeller Foun-
dation built the famous Peking Union 
Medical College-the finest medical 
school and hospital [at that time] in all of 
Asia. 
Our attitude, undoubtedly, was some-
what patronizing and involved an enor-
mous amount of ignorance about that 
great people. Nevertheless, it was a very 7 
friendly one. 
Then , in 1931 , the year I graduated from 
college, the Japanese seized Manchuria. 
Most people told us at that time that it was 
too far away-it was none of our business. 
So, I was to find myself in an army uniform 
in Burma, which was even further away. 
Forever etched on my memory . . . from 
MovieTone News-no television in those 
days- is the picture of Wei lington Koo, 
[Chinese diplomat] standing before the 
League of Nations, pleading for the help 
that never came. One of the things he got 
for his pains was a remark by the foreign 
secretary of Great Britain , "Oh dear, I 
wish he would be more Well ington and 
less Koo. " Secretary of State Henry Stim-
son [U.S. secretary of state, 1929-1933] 
was not able to take any action beyond 
declaring that we would not recognize 
any situation brought about by force, the 
so-called "Stimson Doctrine." 
As a student, I became quite an expert, 
or tried to become an expert, on the com-
missions appointed by the League of Na-
tions ... their reports ... the futi I ity of the 
world's approach to that problem. As a 
young man, I found myself in a picket line, 
protesting the scrap iron being shipped to 
Japan out of the Port of Oakland, Calif. 
Then we saw the general attack on 
China and the attack [by Italy] on Ethiopia. 
And the [U.S.] Senate at that time did not 
even permit Secretary of State Cordell 
Hu 11 [1933-1944] to make a statement say-
ing that if the League of Nations decided 
to impose sanctions on these aggressions, 
that the United States would not insist 
upon its right to trade as a neutral nation. 
My generation of students went down 
the chute into the catastrophe of World 
War 11 , wh ich could have been prevented. 
And then came Pearl Harbor. During the 
weeks and months immediately following 
Pearl Harbor, we needed China for pur-
poses of our own. Hitler's armies were 
smashing at the gates of Leningrad .. 
Moscow ... and Stalingrad. Rommel was 
rushing across North Africa toward Cairo. 
Our intelligence people were tel ling Pres-
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ident Franklin Roosevelt that Russia would 
be knocked out of the war in the next 
few weeks. 
We did not have the arms with which to 
mob ii ize our own forces, except at a snail's 
pace. The Japanese had destroyed the 
heart of our fleet at Pearl Harbor and were 
rushing through Asia. And we saw no way 
to stop them. We needed to think of China 
as a great power, a faithful ally, stub-
bornly resisting the Japanese through an 
entire decade of unassisted effort, be-
cause, otherwise, the world would look 
very grim indeed, at that time. So, we 
underestimated the extent to which that 
decade of combat had brought about an 
attrition of the China which we had 
known .. . its institutions ... its govern-
ment ... its economy. Nevertheless, we 
set out to do what we could. 
It was my privilege to serve for two 
years as the chief of war plans to General 
Joe Stilwell in the China-Burma-India 
deal [CBI]. 
The China-Burma-India Theater was the 
lowest priority among the overseas thea-
ters of operation. We all agreed that the 
war against Hitler shou Id take first priority, 
that the Pacific Theaters would take sec-
ond priority, with CBI at the bottom. 
We were trying to punch through some 
communications into China to try to help 
China stay in the war. We were aware 
of the long-range contingency that there 
might have to be a majorwar fought on the 
mainland of China against the Japanese 
armies regard less of what might have hap-
pened in Tokyo. But then we had forgotten 
that General Stilwell had, in essence, an 
impossible mission. From the American 
point of view it was his job to try to get 
armies into China to fight the Japanese 
as soon, and as hard, as possible, and to 
get the British army in India to do the 
same. But, it became very clear that 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was not 
going to commit such armies as he had 
against the Japanese, because he was 
looking over his shoulders at the problem 
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of the control of China itself at the end of 
the war. In effect, looking over his shoul-
ders at the Communists. 
... There was never any 
serious question of the 
United States intervention 
to assist the nationalist 
Chinese forces on the 
mainland. 
It was equally apparent that Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill was not going 
to commit the [British] army in India to a 
major involvement with the Japanese 
forces until after the defeat of Hitler, be-
cause the army in India was the only Im-
perial Reserve he had. Indeed, for a con-
siderable period , the Middle East was 
held by the British army in India, and the 
Australians and the New Zealanders. So, 
the very nature of Stilwell 's mission: I will 
hold your coat, you do the fighting. He had 
almost no resources of his own. 
Stilwell had a deep love for the Chinese 
people at the grass roots. And he was very 
impatient with the inadequacies of the 
political and economic situation as far as 
the Chinese people were concerned. Then 
came the end of the war and the moves of 
the Communists to take over the entire 
country. 
Let me say straightaway, there was 
never any serious question of the United 
States intervention to assist the nationalist 
Chinese forces on the mainland. In the 
first place, we did not have any capabili-
ties in that direction, because of an almost 
total demobilization after V-J Day. By 
1946, we were told by our Joint Chiefs nf 
Staff that we did not have a single division 
in our army nor a single group in our air 
force that cou Id be rated ready for combat 
The ships of our navy were being put into 
mothballs as fast as we could find berths 
for them, and those that remained afloat 
were being manned by skeleton crews. 
For three fiscal years in that period, our 
defense budget came down to a I ittle 
more than $11 billion, groping fora -
of $10 billion. So there was no c~ 
But in any event, those of us 
had any experience with China kn 
even a substantial remobilization -
armed forces could do no more thfu 
haps hold a few port cities without 
an appreciable effect upon the h 
of millions of Chinese in the back 
try. PresidentTruman sent General 
Marshall to China on a mission 
was predictably doomed to fai lure. 
cause about all that he could inject: 
the conversation were thoughts . . . - -
. . recommendations. But the force:; 
China were so powerful and so -
that the American voice speaking -
country that was so far away had veiy - -
influence on what happened. 
After a rather brief civi I war, the 
munist forces succeeded in taking -= 
the entire mainland. And the natiOfE 
forces , their government, and maa -
their personnel fled to Taiwan. When~== 
did so, the Communist authorities seerE:: 
to choose America as enemy number -
They took extraordinary measures to e.'E.S; 
from memory-among the Chine~ 
century of goodwill and friendly rela · 
They even arrested and beat up some -
our consular officials who were on -= 
mainland. They did such things as cha~ 
that the purpose of the Peking Ur;--
Med ical College was to permit wid -=-
Americans to practice vivisection on -=-
Chinese. 
Our reaction was that of a jilted lo 
"The Chinese people, they've tu 
against us. They've become bitter, 
are our enemies. How could this have tia::"'-
pened." And it was China that provide: 
much of the base for that evil chapter -
our national historv called McCarthvisr. 
perhaps the lowest point of which was=.. 
charge by a' senator from Indiana 
George Marshall was a traitor-and 
failure of the President of that day to g· = 
that senator a prompt and decisive rem:= 
When the British ambassador of tlE 
day came to inform me in 1949 that Britaifi 
ae 
3
Rusk: One Man's Journey with China
Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
was proceeding to recognize the People's 
~public of China on a purely personal 
:iasis, we rather agreed that it was regret-
-JI that the policy of our two governments 
:ould diverge on so important a matter. 
then, purely personally, we speculated 
=iat perhaps our two policies would come 
;:igether again, depending upon the con-
:;uct of the government in Peking. That, if 
:;iey entered the world community on a 
:::ooperative basis and established area-
':Dflable course of conduct, the American 
:x>l icy wou_ld move toward recognizing 
~king. But 1f they acted in the other direc-
:JOn, the British policy might move back 
. where we were before the British recog-
ized [Peking]. 
1 helped to invent the 
ar!iamentary formula by · 
h1ch we kept the Chinese 
seat for the Republic of 
China on Taiwan. 
Then came the Chinese intrusion into 
orea, which led the United Nations for 
::18 first time-I think perhaps the only 
e-to call anybody an aggressor. Of 
::ourse, the Korean adventure postponed, 
the time being , any real thought in 
ilashington about what might be called 
llormal relations." I helped to invent the 
:rarl1arr:entary formula by which we kept 
?Je Chinese seat [at the United Nations] 
01" the Republic of China on Taiwan. At 
~ time, we thought that this formula 
ight last for perhaps four or five years. I 
:::iersonally was rather astonished to find 
::lat it lasted into the early 1970s. 
Something happened in the mid-'50s 
::iat wi 11 interest you. You've never known 
is before. Mr. John Foster Dulles was 
=ien the secretary of state; I was in New 
_ork at the Rockefeller Foundation. In the 
er part of 1955, he asked me to come 
see him in Washinaton. and risked if I 
uld be willing to undertake a very pri-
'3te and discreet negotiation between 
::rriself and Senator Walter George, then-
a1rman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Anmittee, with regard to a possible 
change in our China policy. I told him I'd 
be willing to do it if he wished me to, and 
we had two or three discussions on how 
the discussions might go. 
But suddenly, then-Governor Herman 
Talmadge of Georgia announced that he 
was going to run against Senator George, 
and shortly thereafter, Senator George an-
nounced that he would not seek re-
election. And Mr. Dulles made the judge-
ment that under those circumstances 
Senator George wou Id not take on so 
complicated and controversial an issue as 
the China question, and the whole matter 
was dropped. But Mr. Dulles ' attitude 
toward a possible change had been re-
flected in an article which he had pub-
1 ished_ before he became secretary of 
state, 1n which he seemed to point toward 
the notion of two Chinas. 
When Kennedy became President, I 
had a long talk with him-just the two of 
us-about our China policy and the alter-
natives that might be open to us. He had 
in front of him a resolution passed bv the 
Congress about two or three years earlier, 
almost unanimous, which strongly ob-
jected to any change in the Chinese seat 
at the United Nations and bi-lateral rec-
ognition. More importantly, he was told 
by Presid_ent Eisenhower the day before 
inauguration, that Mr. Eisenhower would 
try to support him as much as possible on 
foreign policy, but on one matter he would 
oppose him publicly and strongly, and 
that would have to do with the Chinese 
seat at the United Nations or any bi-lateral 
recognition of Peking. 
President Kennedy had been elected 
by only a few tens of thousands of votes in 
1960. He used to say "Cook County, Illi-
nois." He did not feel that he had a strong 
mandate from the people in that election. 
And he was rather cautious about select-
ing the issues on which he was prepared 
to do battle- particularly with the Con-
gress. So, he decided that there was not 
enough in it, from a foreign policy point of 
view, to warrant taking on so severe a con-
frontation as that. He decided that he did 
not wish to re-open the China question. As g 
I was leaving the room, he called out to 
me: "And what 's more, Mr. Secretary, I 
don't want to read in The Washington Post 
or The New York Times that the State De-
partment is thinking about a new look at 
the China policy. " 
I went back to the [State] Department 
and when Adlai Stevenson and Chester 
Bowles and some others would drop in to 
talk about China, I simply played the role 
of the "village idiot." I didn't tell them of 
my talk with the President because I 
would have read that in The Washington 
Post or The New York Times. My own 
quess is that had President KP.nn1=>rh1 
lived and been re-elected in '64 with a 
strong mandate, he might have moved 
toward a different attitude. 
During the Johnson years, we had great 
difficulty with Peking over Southeast Asia. 
Peking took the view that Viet Nam and 
these other problems were not the busi-
ness of the United Nations, that they 
shouldn 't even try to deal with them. That 
led then-Secretary General U Thant and 
a good many members of the United Na-
tions to think that it would be unwise for 
the United Nations to try to take up the 
matter. There were times, for example, 
when we wanted to put something about 
Southeast Asia to the Security Council, 
counted noses ahead of time and found 
that we did not have the nine votes with 
which to put the matter on the agenda, 
even for discussion. But then Peking also 
would not utilize the machinery of the 
Geneva Conference for the purpose of 
discussing the possibility of a peaceful 
settlement. So, that was not a very good 
time to take up the question of China 
policy. 
When I left office in January 1969, the 
Republ_ic of China on Taiwan was holding 
the Chinese seat in the United Nations 
and our recognition continued with Tai-
wan. But I would have to say here that our 
friends on the island ofTaiwan have never 
fully realized what a burden they imposed 
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10 upon our diplomacy, and indeed upon our 
own rationality, by living with that fantasy 
that they were the government of all 
China, that they would return to the main-
land, and that in doing so they would have 
major American support. 
There were moments when this not only 
was an embarrassment to us, it came close 
to being a humiliation to us. I remember 
on one occasion in the early '60s, for ex-
ample, we were concerned about some 
Americans who were being held prisoners 
in Peking. We tried various ways to get 
them out with no success. I happened to 
be meeting with a very high-ranking Soviet 
official , and in the course of my talk sug-
gested that we would appreciate it if his 
government thought that they could put in 
a good word for these Americans in Pe-
king. And he immediately said , "Oh no, 
you 'l l have to be in touch with them your-
selves about that." And I said , perhaps un-
wisely, "But we don't recognize Peking. " 
Whereupon , he shrugged his shoulders 
and said , "Well , then take it up with Chiang 
Kai-shek. " 
This gap between theory and the real 
world became increasingly hard to live 
with. One by one, we lost our NATO allies 
in votes in the United Nations. They long 
since moved to de-recognize Taiwan-
whatever that means-and recognize 
Peking. Then came the dramatic moment 
of Mr. [Henry] Kissinger's secret visit to 
Peking to arrange a visit to that country by 
President Nixon. It caught people's imag-
ination. There was substantial approval of 
what he had done around the country. 
Forty years ago international lawyers 
would have said that if the President of 
the United States went to such a capital , 
met with the leaders of that government, 
issued a communique-such as the 
Shanghai Communique-that would have 
constituted recognition. But these days, in 
the post-war period , we require the essen-
tial element of intent to recognize. And so 
governments who don't recognize each 
other can sit in the same conferences, 
sign the same agreements, sit together at 
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the United Nations and ask each other for 
votes without exchanging recognition. 
That visit [by Richard Nixon] and the 
later visit by President Ford proved to be 
a genuine watershed in the way in which 
we would handle this problem. 
Who has the authority in our 
constitutional system to 
terminate a treaty? 
President Carter, at the expense of con-
siderable controversy, has addressed 
himself with courage to a series of ques-
tions he found festering on his desk when 
he became President. Panama ... The 
Middle East . . . The SALT talks ... China . . . 
Southern Africa. And so he decided to 
take the steps necessary to normalize re-
lations with the People 's Republic in Pe-
king. That inc luded giving notice-the 
one year notice of the termination of our 
mutual defense treaty with the Republic 
of China on Taiwan within the terms of the 
treaty itself. That ra ised a constitutional 
issue. 
Who has the authority in our constitu-
tional system to terminate a treaty? 
This is not quite the case of an abroga-
tion of a treaty, although the two are 
closely related. We 've seen in the past 
that th is has been done by the President 
and the Congress acting together, by the 
Congress acting alone, by the President 
acting alone. In any event, precedents are 
not clear guidance on such a question 
because each situation has many unique 
features and one can always debate how 
relevant the precedents are to the imme-
diate situation. One also bears in mind 
these constitutional issues very seldom 
arise if there is agreement on the policy. 
For example, three years ago President 
Ford gave notice-two years notice-that 
we would withdraw from the International 
Labor Organization as provided in the 
charter of the International Labor Orga-
nization. I don't recall any debate on the 
constitutional issue at that time, because 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, repre-
senting the employers, and the AFL 
representing the workers, both clap 
hands at the action taken. The con - -
tional question simply did not arise. 
I was with President Kennedy whe -c. 
met with about 30 leaders of the Cong 
to talk with them briefly about the Cu 
missile eris is late in the afternoon of~ 
famous Monday [October 1962] when -
made his television speech to the n --
on the Cuban missiles. In that discuss·~ 
no senator, no congressman, raised c.. 
question about whether the President 
the constitutional authority to take :__ 
action which he was going to take wi 
com ing to the Congress. The genelE 
mood as expressed by three or four sere-
tors ... on their way out of the door, -
private remarks, was 'Thank God, I'm 
the President of the United States." 
But now we have the constitutional i = 
stimulated by some serious difference:o 
on the policy. Senator [Barry] Goldwate 
and some of his colleagues have filed c. 
brief in the Federal District Court in Wa -
ington, raising a constitutional challen 
to the action taken by the President. 
I've studied that brief and from 
point of view it is an able brief. Now that 
am a private citizen , I don't have to try 
be a prophet anymore. But, if I had 
guess, along with Jimmy-the-Greek, 
wou Id guess that the Federal Courts are 
not likely to try to decide this matter on its 
merits. They're likely to say that this is a 
political question which is to be deter-
mined by the political branches of ou 
government. 
If the courts decide to take up this 
question on merits alone, then I think we 
could have a very interesting decision, 
because I personally feel that it is a very 
close question of constitutional law if it is 
to be approached purely on that basis. 
Why the timing? 
I have not been briefed by anyone in 
the Executive Branch of the government 
so I can speak freely. My guess is that the 
timing of this move had important con-
nections with things that seem to be hap-
pening in the People's Republic of China. 
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I hope there is no one, 
whether in government or 
out, who thinks of this move 
with respect to China as 
playing the China card 
against the Soviet Union. 
They seem to be opening up the country 
:o the rest of the world in a most unac-
:;ustomed way, as we think of this post-war 
:Jeriod . They seem to be moving toward 
'.ap id ly irrcreasing trade and contacts with 
her countries in the interest of the mod-
gmization of their country. They are trying 
ill restore higher education to the genuine 
-ole of higher education in a society. They 
are interested in exchange of students 
3nd professors, and in expansion of tour-
- m-which, of course, must include Coca 
ve la. In other words, there are signs that 
is nation of almost a billion people now 
may be moving toward joining the rest of 
e human race in a good many common 
9flterprises. 
At the same time, I think the American 
:Jeople-many of them-continue to have 
a strong concern about what's going to 
nappen to the 16 million or so people in 
Taiwan. It will be up to the Chinese in Pe-
·ng to sort out for themselves in their own 
inds what benefits they hope to obtain 
- om normalizat ion from their point of view. 
I would hope they would be understand-
g enough of our people and our govern-
ent to know that any attempt to settle the 
uestion of Taiwan by force would sur-
~nder a great many of those benefits that 
ey'd hoped for in connection with the 
""X>rmalization of our relations. 
I hope there is no one, whether in gov-
~ment or out, who thinks of this move 
ith respect to China as playing the Ch ina 
:;ard against the Soviet Union. Moscow 
=.rid Peking are much too intel ligent to let 
get away with any such chi Id 's game 
maneuvers between them. Surely, we 
JUght to-and I think the President hinted 
- this in his press conference [Jan. 26, 
"979]-we ought to try to find ways to 
improve our relations with the Soviet 
Union, try to find ways to improve our 
relations with the Chinese, and hope most 
profoundly, that they do not get into a 
general war with each other. D 
11 
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